In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Scientia propter quid nobis—The Epistemic Independence of Metaphysics and Theology in the Quaestio de cognitione Dei attributed to Duns Scotus by Wouter GorisClaus A. AndersenGORIS, Wouter. Scientia propter quid nobis—The Epistemic Independence of Metaphysics and Theology in the Quaestio de cognitione Dei attributed to Duns Scotus. Münster: Aschendorff, 2022. viii + 296 pp. Paper, € 49.00The central claim of Wouter Goris's new book is that the (...) Quaestio de cognitione Dei traditionally (both in one late medieval manuscript and in some modern scholarship) attributed to John Duns Scotus not only is inauthentic but in fact represents an early reaction against Scotus's teaching on the scientific nature of metaphysics. The Quaestio in particular explores Scotus's distinction between a science "in itself" and one "for us" and, going beyond Scotus's own doctrine, shows how this distinction is applicable to metaphysics.The book is divided into three parts. Part 1 offers a critical edition of the Quaestio de cognitione Dei, which has hitherto been available in a plain transcription published by C. R. S. Harris in 1927. Harris's text was based on a single manuscript from the fifteenth century (Oxford, Merton College, Ms. 90); Goris bases his edition on a manuscript from the early fourteenth century (Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, Ms. 172), one that does not attribute the text to Scotus. Goris highlights that the text has significant parallels in the prologue of John of Reading's Scriptum on the first book of the Sentences; there is presently not sufficient evidence for claiming that Reading is the author of the De cognitione Dei, but it does seem clear that either Reading or some other Franciscan friar relying on Reading's Scriptum authored the text between 1316 and 1325. The Quaestio itself consists of two articles. Two appendices to the edition document longer passages from Reading's Scriptum.Part 2 investigates the use of the distinction between a science in itself and one for us in Duns Scotus and some of the early Scotists. Scotus's doctrine developed over time. At Oxford Scotus taught that theology in se is about the divine essence in its particularity; theology for us is about the most perfect concept of God attainable for human beings by natural means, that is, the concept "infinite being." It falls to metaphysics to prove that there is such a kind of being. At Paris Scotus rather taught that both theology in se and theology for us are about the divine essence in its [End Page 549] particularity. The implication is that a strictly demonstrative science about God is possible for human beings in this present life, a knowledge of God that is completely independent of metaphysics. Goris argues that this shift in the view of theology explains the absence of Scotus's famous "twin doctrines" of the univocal concept of being and of being as the first adequate object of the intellect from his theological epistemology of the Parisian period. Not too surprisingly, in the wake of Scotus we find several authors grappling with the relationship between theology and metaphysics. The positions investigated by Goris vary considerably. Richard of Conington distinguishes between human metaphysical knowledge of being and God's own metaphysical knowledge of being; the latter represents a more perfect knowledge of both God himself and creatures as included under the concept of being. Francis of Marchia employs a distinction between a general metaphysics (about being as being) and a special metaphysics (about divine being), but on the level of science for us the special part of metaphysics is subordinated to the general one. Nicolas Bonetus, by contrast, advocates a sharp distinction between metaphysical knowledge of being and natural theology; he structures his metaphysics as a purely ontological discipline and treats natural theology as a separate science; Goris sees this reorganization as Bonetus's most decisive contribution to the history of metaphysics.Part 3 analyzes the fundamental doctrines defended in the Quaestio de cognitione Dei and compares them with those of Scotus and John of Reading. The first article of the Quaestio introduces two important distinctions, the first of which is between metaphysics in itself and metaphysics for us; these two... (shrink)

This paper enquires into the possibility of establishing a causal link between social performance (SP) and financial performance (FP) in corporate social responsibility (CSR). It shows that this endeavour is limited by several biasing factors (such as time horizons, sample choices and the tools chosen to measure SP and FP) and faces the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc (after this, therefore because of this), which indicates that a sequence of events does not necessarily establish a causal link. (...) The paper contributes to the methodological literature in CSR currently focused on empirical tests aiming to discern the linkages between SP and FP, both by emphasising the interest in interpreting and justifying SP and by suggesting a redirection of empirical efforts towards the understanding of entrepreneurial preference for a specific type of SP. (shrink)

In Posterior Analytics 1.13, Aristotle introduced a distinction between two kinds of demonstrations: of the fact (quia), and of the reasoned fact (propter quid). Both demonstrations take a syllogistic form, in which the middle term links either two facts (in the case of quia demonstrations) or a proximate cause and a fact (in the case of propter quid demonstrations). While Aristotle stated that all the terms of one demonstration must be taken from within the same subject matter, he (...) admitted some exceptions in which the fact and the reasoned fact are instantiated by terms from different sciences, as when mathematics provides the reason and another science the empirical fact. This was the methodological foundation of the “mixed sciences”, a subject of varying interpretations in the thirteenth century. Roger Bacon (C. 1220–1292), adhering to Robert Grosseteste’s (C. 1168–1563) commentary on Posterior Analytics, presented a unique interpretation of this exception. He replaced propositional demonstrations with geometrical considerations and diagrams, thus producing geometrical arguments for theorems in natural philosophy. I focus on Bacon’s propter quid arguments, as applied in three case studies: (1) the heat caused by a body moving to its natural place; (2) the motion of the scale; (3) and the contraction of water. Based on an analysis of these demonstrations, I argue that Bacon’s interpretation of propter quid demonstration reflects his application of a scientific methodology that imbues geometrical objects with causal power over material bodies. (shrink)

Die metaphysische Spekulation über die Natur der Ideen gilt als eines der wichtigsten philosophischen Themen bis weit ins 20. Jahrhundert hinein. Im Nachdenken über die Ideen hat die Metaphysik versucht, die unveränderlichen Prinzipien zu entdecken, die die Wirklichkeit ordnen und ihren intelligiblen Charakter erklären und begründen. Die Frage nach den Ideen liegt somit an der Basis des metaphysischen Denkens überhaupt, das nach der klassischen Bestimmung des Aristoteles als Wissenschaft von den Prinzipien und Ursachen des Seienden als solchen verstanden werden kann.

Research suggests that the explicit reasoning we offer to ourselves and to others is often rationalization, that we act instead on instincts, inclinations, stereotypes, emotions, neurobiology, habits, reactions, evolutionary pressures, unexamined principles, or justifications other than the ones we think we’re acting on, then we tell a post hoc story to justify our actions. I consider two benefits of rationalization, once we realize that rationalization is sincere. It allows us to work out, under practical pressure of rational consistency, which are (...) good reasons to act on. Rationalization also prompts us to establish meaningful patterns out of merely permissible options. (shrink)

IT is strange that the informal fallacies should strike us as such obvious breaches of thinking and advocacy, yet should have met with such little success in finding a respectable home within mature logical theory. It might seem that respectable and mature logical theory is most mature and most respectable in the theory of propositions, and that its maturity and respectability in the other logical domains rapidly diminish in inverse proportion to the susceptibility of those domains to be reduced to (...) the logic of propositions. But we are not anxious to promote so severe a view of theoretical accomplishment, and we shall suppose that, at the very least, the informal fallacies have a degree of systematicity that will at once advance our understanding of them nicely beyond the level of intuitive impressions, and also place into retirement the hopelessly inadequate accounts that litter too many otherwise admirable textbooks. (shrink)

O presente artigo intenta perquirir o pensamento do abade e místico medieval Joaquim de Fiore (1132-1202), no que tange a concepção escatológica. O abade cisterciense e filósofo místico, defensor do milenarismo e do advento da idade do Espírito Santo deu origem a diversos movimentos filosóficos, com destaque para os joaquimitas. Seu pensamento foi combatido por Tomás de Aquino e condenado pelo Concílio de Laterão de 1215. Partindo de uma releitura dos escritos de Joaquim de Fiore (Liber Concordiae Novi ac Veteris (...) Testamenti, Expositio in Apocalipsim e Psalterium Decem Chordarum) buscar-se-á ponderar o contributo de seu pensamento, a teologia como história trinitário-escatológica. O abade calabrês sente-se autorizado a superar o absolutismo crístico, favorecendo uma concepção mais trinitária da história com acentos escatológicos e apocalípticos. Por fim, o artigo busca contribuir positivamente no retorno aos escritos joaquinistas que muito podem contribuir para a teologia como história humano-Trintária. (shrink)

El objetivo de este pequeño trabajo es ayudar a comprender la necesidad de la composición real en el ser participado. Lo hacemos sirviéndonos de una parte de la magnífica obra del p. Fabro, La noción metafísica de participación. En la primera parte de nuestro trabajo nos serviremos de algunos de los textos de Santo Tomás que reportaba el p. Fabro, los que más nos ayuden a comprender la demostración. En la segunda, y al mismo efecto, estudiaremos el silogismo del p. (...) Fabro, con el cual dicho autor trataba de condensar la demostración de la composición real en todo ser participado. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Scotus’s claim that the categories are the subject of a propter quid science. In order to see the significance of this claim, I first trace the development of the idea that the categories are the subject of a science from Martin of Denmark, Peter of Auvergne, and Simon of Faversham. I then turn toDuns Scotus’s account of the categories as the subject of a propter quid science. Throughout the discussion, I concentrate on the (...) fundamental problems confronting anyone who claims that there is a science of the categories: namely, how they, being ten, can have an appropriate unity. Scotus, as we will see, will answer this problem by claiming that the intellect causes a greater unity in second intentions than the corresponding unity that exists in the world. As a consequence, Scotus contends that the categories are the subject of a propter quid science, one that is radically different from the science of metaphysics. (shrink)

This short essay will attempt to show that although Karl Rahner would be in basic agreement with the concern of “Dominus Iesus” about “religious relativism” and in basic agreement with the claims of the Catholic Church (as expressed in Vatican II) about the role of Jesus as universal savior and about the unique role of the Roman Catholic church in God’s salvific plan for the world, he would not agree with the spirit or tone of this declaration from a (...) Vatican Congregation. Rahner’s writings set a more positive tone framed by his classic retrieval of the concept of mystery in Roman Catholic theology that invites dialog with people of other religious traditions. Three characteristics of that invitational spirit of Rahner are highlighted in this essay: (1) the life-long process of becoming Christian; (2) the inadequacy of all human expressions in the face of mystery; (3) the need to be non-competitive in any ecumenical or inter-religious dialog. (shrink)

In general, the false cause fallacy occurs when the “link between premises and conclusion depends on some imagined causal connection that probably does not exist”. There are three different ways an argument can commit the false cause fallacy: post hoc ergo propter hoc; cum hoc ergo propter hoc; and ignoring common cause. This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'ignoring common cause'. The commercial exploited the false cause fallacy to get consumers to buy (...) its product. This fallacy is also present in many of the arguments concerning the alleged connection between vaccines and autism despite the plethora of evidence otherwise. The chapter consists of various examples showcasing the fallacy of ignoring common cause. It also compares the examples, showing that slight changes can lead the other types of false cause fallacies to occur. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy: 'false cause'. In general, the false cause fallacy occurs when the “link between premises and conclusion depends on some imagined causal connection that probably does not exist”. There are three different ways an argument can commit the false cause fallacy: post hoc ergo propter hoc; cum hoc ergo propter hoc; and ignoring common cause. Like the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, this fallacy is guilty (...) of trying to establish a causal connection between two events on dubious grounds. The way to avoid committing the cum hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy is to study correlative relationships more carefully in order to decipher if an actual causal relationship exists rather than assuming the latter follows from the former. (shrink)

W. Goris, Scientia propter quid nobis. The Epistemic Independence of Metaphysics and Theology in the Quaestio de cognitione Dei attributed to Duns Scotus, Aschendorff, Munster 2022 (Archa Verbi. Su...

The name Iphianassa occurs only once in Latin literature—in the proem toDe Rerum Natura(=DRN). Here Lucretius illustrates the evils of religion with a description of Iphianassa's sacrifice at Aulis (1.80–101):illud in his rebus uereor, ne forte rearisimpia te rationis inire elementa uiamqueindugredi sceleris. quod contra saepius illareligio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta.Aulide quo pacto Triuiai uirginis aramIphianassai turparunt sanguine foedeductores Danaum delecti, prima uirorum.cui simul infula uirgineos circumdata comptusex utraque pari malarum parte profusast,et maestum simul ante aras adstare parentemsensit et (...) hunc propter ferrum celare ministrosaspectuque suo lacrimas effundere ciuis,muta metu terram genibus summissa petebat.nec miserae prodesse in tali tempore quibatquod patrio princeps donarat nomine regem.nam sublata uirum manibus tremibundaque ad arasdeductast, non ut sollemni more sacrorumperfecto posset claro comitari Hymenaeo,sed casta inceste nubendi tempore in ipsohostia concideret mactatu maesta parentis,exitus ut classi felix faustusque daretur.tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.It is clear that Lucretius treats the name Iphianassa as a synonym for Iphigenia. Homer (Il. 9.145, 9.287) and Sophocles (El. 157) mention a daughter of Agamemnon called Iphianassa, but in neither author is she the daughter who was sacrificed at Aulis (and in several versions rescued at the last moment by Artemis). The first known mention of this myth was in theCypria, where, according to the summary of Proclus, the daughter was called Iphigenia (Kinkel,EGF19; Bernabé,PEG1.41). Hesiod refers to it in theCatalogue of Women, where he calls the daughter Iphimede (Cat. fr. 23a.15–26 + b M-W). From the fifth centuryb.c.e., the extant sources, beginning with Pindar (Pyth. 11.22) and Aeschylus (Ag. 1526, 1555), call her Iphigenia. Why did Lucretius choose Iphianassa? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Delatores And The Tradition Of Violence In Roman OratorySteven H. RutledgeTwo very prominent scholars have asserted that oratory became more violent and aggressive during the early Principate, as delatores (professional accusers and informants) came to dominate the genre. 1 This assumption has a place in a number of studies on Roman history, culture, and literature which accept their premise. 2 However, such an assumption, before it is accepted, needs (...) to be set in the larger context of Roman oratory over the period from the Republic to the Empire. It is my object here to do just that, for I propose that the new style—one which is generally perceived as more violent—represents not so much a change as a continuity in Roman rhetorical practice, and that the perceived transformation is more a product of how our sources represent orators in the first century c.e. rather than oratory’s metamorphosis into something with a perceptibly more violent style. To that end my argument has two parts. First, we need to put professional accusers into their republican as well as imperial context. Professional accusers in [End Page 555] particular were by no means exclusive to the Empire, and even in Cicero’s time they were associated with a more violent style. 3 After we set them in their larger historical context, we may then set them in their rhetorical context: Roman rhetorical theorists expected prosecution, in which delatores specialized, to be more violent by its very nature—something generally overlooked by scholars. All of this is not to deny that rhetoric underwent a fundamental change between the Republic and Empire; that is indisputable. Rather, I suggest that given the nature of what delatores did, in and of itself, and given our sources, it is very difficult to conclude that the style of delatores was essentially more “savage and aggressive” than that of their predecessors under the Republic. It was the inherent nature of Roman oratory and the ever-competitive milieu of Roman politics—during both the Republic and the Empire—which worked in unison to create such continuity. It is the nature of our sources under the Empire, on the other hand, which has led scholars to a distorted impression of oratory in the first century c.e.Let us turn first to accusatio under the Republic. Accusation appears to have always been a morally dubious undertaking, and the revulsion felt by Tacitus and Pliny under the Empire at those who pursued it professionally was by no means unique to their age. Cicero, our main source for this activity during the late Republic, by all indica-tions felt accusation generally unethical and something to be avoided, for while he noted that it could indeed make a reputation, he also remarked that prosecution ought to be undertaken only in certain circumstances. 4 Pursuit of such activity, if it turned into a habit, could become [End Page 556] an embarrassment for the accuser’s family, as Cicero indicates it was for M. Brutus’: Isdem temporibus M. Brutus, in quo magnum fuit, Brute, dedecus generi vestro, qui, cum tanto nomine esset patremque optimum virum habuisset et iuris peritissimum, accusationem factitaverit (Brut. 130). But even if it was not the habit of an individual to accuse, it was necessary to justify at length the acceptance of a case for the prosecution, as Cicero illustrates in his apology, in Divinatio in Caecilium (passim), for taking up the accusation against Verres. That prosecution was an ethically questionable activity is by no means in doubt; we see an inherent bias against prosecution in Rome in Cicero’s day, one which was carried over into the Empire and which left its mark on our sources. 5This did not prevent orators, however, from habitually undertaking prosecutions. One of the initial indications that orators had started to specialize in accusation is found in Cicero’s Pro S. Roscio Amerino (89–90), where he notes that the dominatio of Cinna and Sulla served as impetus for such activity: 6Verum ego forsitan propter multitudinem patronorum in grege adnumerer, te pugna Cannensis accusatorem sat bonum fecit. Multos caesos non ad Trasumenum lacum, sed ad Servilium vidimus. Quis ibi non... (shrink)

Books reviewed in this article:John Barton, The Biblical WorldWalter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, AdvocacyBernhard W. Anderson, Contours of Old Testament TheologyJames Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology: An Old Testament PerspectiveCarl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, Reclaiming the Bible for the ChurchNancy L. deClaissè‐Walford, Reading from th eBeginning: The Shaping of the Hebrew PsalterBirger Gerhardsson, The Reliability of the Gospel TraditionBen Witherington III, New Testament History: A Narrative AccountNeil Richardson, God in the New TestamentJohn S. (...) Kloppenborg Verbin, Excavating Q: The History and Setting of the Sayings GospelFrancis J. Moloney, The Gospel of JohnMartin Hengel and Anna Maria Schwemer, Paul Between Damascus and Antioch. The Unknown YearsF. Gerald Downing, Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches: Cynics and Christian Origins IIAnthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the CorinthiansKieran J. O'Mahony, Pauline Persuasion: A Sounding in 2 Corinthians 8‐9C. K. Barrett, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, Volume I: Acts XV–XXVIIApril D. DeConick, Voices of the Mystics: Early Christian Discourse in the Gospels of John and Thomas and Other Ancient Christian LiteratureManlio Simonetti, Ippolito. Contro NoetoCatherine Brown Tkacz, The Key to the Brescia Casket: Typology and the Early Christian ImaginationSerge Lancel, St AugustinePatricia Cox Miller, The Poetry of Thought in Late Antiquity: Essays in Imagination and ReligionThomas Head, Medieval Hagiography: An AnthologyAllan Greer, The Jesuit Relations: Natives and Missionaries in Seventeenth‐Century North AmericaStephen R. Holmes, God of Glory and God of Grace: An Account of the Theology of Jonathan EdwardsStephen Prickett, Narrative, Religion and Science. Fundamentalism versus Irony, 1700–1999Linda Woodhead, Reinventing Christianity: Nineteenth‐Century ContextsFlorent Gaboriau, The Conversion of Edith SteinJeffrey S. Siker, Scripture and Ethics. Twentieth‐Century PortraitsRicherd B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament. Community, Cross, New CreationJohn Kavanaugh, Who Counts as Persons: Human Identity and the Ethics of KillingJohn Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument against LegalisationStephen J. Pope and Charles Hefling, Sic et Non: Encountering ‘Dominus Iesus’J'annine Jobling and Ian Markham, Theological Liberalism, Creative and CriticalHans Küng, Women in ChristianityLynne Broadbent and Alan Brown, Issues in Religious EducationJeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke's Political ThoughtGiles Fraser, Redeeming NietzscheAlexander Garcia Düttman, The Memory of Thought: An Essay on Heidegger and AdornoRobert J. Dostal, The Cambridge Companion to GadamerMichael Fuller, Making Sense of MacIntyre. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to DialogueJohn BorelliChristianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue. By Jacques Dupuis, SJ. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2001. 276 pp.Why read Jacques Dupuis's Christianity and the Religions (2001) when his more comprehensive, ground-breaking Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism (Orbis, 1997) is still available? Father Dupuis reminds us in the introduction to Christianity that he has actually written three books (...) on the same subject—Jesus Christ at the Encounter of World Religions (Orbis, 1991) being the first—but he reaffirms the central importance of Religious Pluralism. After publication of this second work, his editors wanted another volume on the same topic, "less ponderous, more accessible, and aimed at an audience broader than the circle of specialists and the academy." That was the origin of Christianity and the Religions, a story Fr. Dupuis related to me when I visited him at Gregorian University in early February 2001. It was meant to be an easier-to-read version of Religious Pluralism, something for students who do not need abundant references to authors and historical developments. Circumstances, however, added another dimension to the need for yet another volume. [End Page 182]Christianity and the Religions was ready for publication in early 2001, but Fr. Dupuis was waiting for "official notification" from the Holy See's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith regarding its charges that Religious Pluralism contained "serious doctrinal error." By then, the case was in its thirty-second and final month, for later in February 2001 he received word from Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, prefect of the Congregation, that the charge had been reduced to "ambiguities and difficulties on important points which could lead a reader to erroneous or harmful opinions." Dupuis last appeared before Cardinal Ratzinger and the Congregation's advisers on the day before Dominus Iesus was released in September 2000, accompanied by Fr. Peter-Hans Kolvenbach, superior general of the Jesuits, and Dupuis's advocate and colleague at the Gregorian University, Fr. Gerald O'Collins. Dupuis used the opportunity of a more accessible version of the book in question to address squarely the charges raised against him. He writes in the introduction to Christianity and the Religions: "Suffice it to say that in this new book I have scrupulously avoided all expressions that could raise any misunderstanding or create ambiguity over either the content of the faith or my thought." Dupuis dedicated the book to retired Cardinal Franz Kōnig. He chose to quote an earlier (1963) text by Cardinal Ratzinger on the page following the dedication: "What the Church needs today, as always, are not adulators to extol the status quo, but men whose humility and obedience are no less than their passion for truth: men who brave every misunderstanding and attack as they bear witness; men who in a word, love the Church more than ease and the unruffled course of their personal destiny." In 1999, Ratzinger and Kōnig had exchanged views, point and counterpoint, in the British Catholic weekly, The Tablet, over Dupuis's earlier Religious Pluralism.Fr. Jacques Dupuis died of an apparent stroke on 28 December 2004 at age 81. Although the investigation had brought him increased attention and invitations to speak, he was in Rome, his home since 1984, at the time of his death. When I visited him in 2001 and again heard him speak at the Catholic University of America just twenty-four days before his death, it was clear how much the case and accompanying suspicion had hurt him. Dupuis was principally a theologian who had considered it his good fortune to have lived and taught in India for thirty-six years. He also had taught theology for nearly fifteen years at Gregorian University, the premier university of his religious order. Many viewed the outcome of the investigation as a vindication of his work because he did not have to change a single sentence in Religious Pluralism for it to remain in publication, but the success of his defense came at a great price. The shadow of suspicion never left him. He had adopted a style of stopping, often amidst reflections on religious... (shrink)

cum prorepserunt primis animalia terris, mutum et turpe pecus, glandem atque cubilia propter unguibus et pugnis, dein fustibus, atque ita porro pugnabant armis, quae post fabricauerat usus, donec uerba, quibus uoces sensusque notarent, nominaque inuenere; dehinc absistere bello, oppida coeperunt munire et ponere leges, ne quis … uoces and sensus are not in pari materia; indeed, uoces notare is nonsense, as Gow says. The defect was first pointed out by Housman, J. Phil. xviii, pp. 5–8; his remedy was to (...) transpose one word and read donec uerba, quibus sensus, uocesque, notarent, nominaque inuenere. I doubt if any scholar not already familiar with Housman's note could understand his Latin here without considerable analytical effort; and I cannot but think that Housman was for once demanding from a pair of commas a cabalistic virtue hardly resident in the seal of Solomon. Admittedly he supplies a long list — one page and a half—of illustrative dislocations; but in my opinion two objections remain. In the first place, ‘interlacing’ of the clauses A B in the form A B A B is quite frequent in Latin verse; but A B A B A is rare in the extreme, not to be found in Horace, not perhaps in any Latin author except Lucretius. Secondly, the insertion of uoces, ‘expressions’ generally , in such a way as to disrupt the pair uerba nominaque ‘verbs and nouns’ would be awkward, and for Horace anomalous, in the most lucid of contexts; here it makes confusion worse confounded. (shrink)

This article pursues Rahner’s idea that the Holy Spirit has the role of “Spirit of Christ” even before the Incarnation, namely as “entelechy” directed to the Christ event. In the article, particular use is made of a biblical text hitherto not invoked in this connection, namely 1 Peter 1:11, from which a biblical base for this theology is developed. The article also investigates Teilhard de Chardin’s theory of evolution encompassing the world religions and Christianity, the absolute religion. The idea of (...) the Spirit of Christ as entelechy is clarified and refined by application of the author’s construct of the “return” model of the Trinity, in which the Son does not just come forth from the Father, but returns to him in the power of the Spirit (see his newly published book, Deus Trinitas). Before, and in reparation for, the Son’s historical return to the Father, in Christ, the Spirit, precisely as entelechy, has to seek him in history, that is, through the creation and evolution of the cosmos, the arrival of humans, the consequent and new operation of the Spirit as grace, and the history of Israel culminating in the lives of Mary and, finally, Jesus, in whom this operation finds its final goal. Moreover, the role of the Spirit as entelechy complements and forms a unity with that of the same Spirit (again “Spirit of Christ”) as sent historically by the glorified Christ upon the Church, and continues even after the Incarnation, in leading to Christ (as “anonymous Christians”) men and women of goodwill, including those belonging to the world religions who have not yet had the gospel effectively preached to them. Finally, the paper notes that it covers some of the same ground as the Vatican Declaration Dominus Iesus, but in a different way, namely as instructed by the work of Teilhard and Rahner. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 165-167 [Access article in PDF] Christianity in the Crucible of East-West Dialogue: A Critical Lookat Catholic Participation; And God, Zen, and the Intuition Of Being. By James Arraj. Chiloquin, Ore: Inner Growth Books, 2001. 335 pp. This book combines an original book-length essay, Critical Look at the Catholic Participation in the East-West Dialogue, and a new edition of the 1988 work God, Zen, and the (...) Intuition of Being. In the first part of the volume, Arraj discusses the approaches of a large variety of individuals and institutions who have been involved in the Christian dialogue with Buddhism (Habito, Enomiya-Lasalle, Jaeger, MacInnes, Hawk, Kennedy, Corless, etc.) and in the dialogue with Hinduism (Abhishiktananda, Grant, de Mello, Griffiths, Teasdale, etc.). The main perspective from which he discusses each of these authors is that of their conception of the relationship between Christian contemplation and enlightenment or realization. Arraj finds most of the existing approaches to the East-West dialogue wanting insofar as they all consider the Christian experience of contemplation from the perspective of the Hindu or Buddhist view of nonduality. As he puts it: "But what does this kind of nondualist imperialism do to Christianity? It eliminates its distinctive nature. Let me be clear about this. Used in this way, Zen awakening, which could be a wonderful gift for Christians, becomes destructive of Christianity" (31). Arraj sees this as but one expression of what he calls reactionary theology or "theology without a net," which has been developing since the Second Vatican Council. As opposed to this form of dialogue, which compromises the essence of Christian faith, Arraj discusses the approaches of Jacques Dupuis and the document Dominus Iesus, which he understands as two different versions of a proper Catholic position. After discussing a number of unsatisfactory approaches to the question of religious pluralism, he introduces the distinction between an existentialist approach, which focuses on the universality of the salvific will of God, and an essentialist approach, which emphasizes the uniqueness of Jesus as the mediator of salvation. This distinction between existence and essence forms one of the dominant themes of the book.Arraj offers an overview and critique of most of the existing approaches to the East-West dialogue, and then moves on to offering alternative proposals for the dialogue. While many are in the process of "overcoming" the metaphysical tradition of Christianity, Arraj sees precisely in this tradition a promising starting point for the dialogue with Zen Buddhism. After analyzing the particularly Thomistic manner of distinguishing essence and existence and some study of references to the experiences of loss of self in the ultimate realization, Arraj comes to the conclusion that what Thomistic metaphysics thinks of as "intuition of being" and what Asian traditions describe as the experience of Enlightenment "are both deeply metaphysical experiences of the same reality, but by different paths, and so they express themselves in different ways" (206). This, then, provides the necessary basis for the two traditions [End Page 165] to retain their respective identities while nonetheless learning from the other. In God, Zen, and the Intuition of Being Arraj offers some thoughts on how this might proceed. The clearest of these thoughts appear to lie on the side of what a discussion with Zen might do for Christianity. This is a matter, first of all, of rekindling an interest in Thomistic metaphysics through an introduction of categories and spiritual techniques that are part of the Zen tradition. At minimum, this would open a way beyond, or perhaps behind, the scholasticism of the manuals that have covered the true profundity of Christian Thomistic metaphysics. Whatever the philosophical stakes of this recovery, Arraj is especially interested in its spiritual promise, in the possibility of inviting certain aspects of Zen meditation—the use of koans, increased attention to nature—to help Christianity in developing a new form of acquired contemplation. Arraj has somewhat less to say about what or how much this sort of dialogue might offer Zen... (shrink)

Duns Scotus's famous proposition was first attacked in a short polemical treatise attributed to Thomas of Sutton. By the time of Ockham, the proposition was known as the propositio famosa, so called by Walter Chatton, Ockham's colleague at Oxford and London, who defended it against Ockham's lengthy critique. At Paris, during the same period, it was called the propositio vulgata and was used approvingly by Francis of Meyronnes, Peter of Navarre and Durandus St. Pourçain. This “famous proposition” was so controverted (...) because on it depended the acceptance, with Duns Scotus, or the rejection, with Ockham, of theology as a strict, propter quid science. As its detractors and defenders must have realized, it also struck at the heart of the divergent philosophical outlooks of Duns Scotus and Ockham. For all of this, Duns Scotus's famous proposition and its history have all but escaped notice. (shrink)

Students of the Orestes are fortunate to have two excellent commentaries at their disposal, by C. W. Willink and M. L. West . Neither will help them to understand this line, which is ‘the only allusion to Ganymede's horsemanship’ , because ‘no story of riding by Ganymede is known’ . But we are repeatedly reminded that the scene with the Phrygian has far fewer affinities with tragedy than with comedy, and εριπιδαριστοφαíζεται Comedy provides the clue, specifically at Ar. Vesp. 50If. (...) and Lys. 676ff. The reference is to the variety of equestrianism for which Ganymede is far from unknown . For Innoavvr) here describes a σχμα ρωτικóν and the line means Ganymedes concubinus, Iovis supini inguini insidens et equitans, sc. inter causas fuit malorum propter Iunonis invidiam Troianis immissorum. (shrink)

The following text seeks to identify the origins of what has come to be called the Sokal hoax. It appears that these origins remain problematic insofar as they cannot be thought without engaging into intrinsically duplicitous thinking. Thus, « originally », the gesture of the hoax is indeed « productive and conflictive, and no self-identity, no unity, and no inherent simplicity can possibly precede it », as « he » said, but « he » was disseminating, as we say. But (...) that is precisely the « strength » of the « form » of the Sokal hoax. With the delicate question of origins as its stumbling block—a stumbling block which may also be the question of irony—, the present text takes its cue from an passage from La Barbarie à visage humain and proposes to reveal the constructive consequences of the affair triggered by the hoax, while constantly paying tribute to its performance. Whether my argument will make it possible to distinguish the consequences from the origins remains moot : post hoc ergo propter hoc. One must remember that this is a sophism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE INCOMMUNICABILITY OF HUMAN PERSONS JOHN F. CROSBY, III Franciscan University of Steubenville Steubenville, Ohio I PROPOSE TO explore the idea that persons do not exist as replaceable specimens of or as mere instances of an ideal or type, but rather exist in some sense for their own sakes, each existing as incommunicably his or her own.1 I undertake this study in the conviction that the incommunicability of persons (...) is profoundly characteristic for them precisely as persons, and has a major role to play in any philosophy of the person. And there is an entirely different reason which attracts me to this subject. I think that most of what I have to say here can find acceptance across a broad spectrum of philosophical positions. At a time when thinkers are increasingly suspicious of universally valid truth about man, when many of them think that a vision of man is proper only to some tradition and valid only within that tradition and not beyond it, one can offer a salutary challenge to one's contemporaries by showing a centrally important truth about persons which, as I say, can be accepted by philosophers coming from the most various points of view. Suppose that you were to minimalize the death of someone by saying that at least the human species did not die with him or her, as if the immortality of the species more than compensated for the mortality of this individual : everyone understands that you would thereby radically depersonalize the deceased. Or suppose that you were grieving over the death of someone dear to you, and a friend tried to comfort you with the thought that the 1 My thanks to Josef Seifert, William Frank, Damian Fedoryka, and Katryna Fedoryka for their comments on earlier drafts of this study. The text of this article forms Chapter Two of my book, Essay on Personal Selfhood, which is close to completion. 403 404 JOHN F. CROSBY, III particular excellences of the deceased, which awakened your love, also exist in other human beings who are still living, as if you could continue to love in them what you had loved in the deceased. Again, everyone understands that if you treat people having excellences as if they were replaceable specimens of those excellences, then you lose your grip on them as persons. But why is this? Why is personhood driven out of human beings as soon as their species-membership, or their particular excellences, are thought to predominate in them? What is that incommunicability of each person which is obscured as soon as persons are thought to be only specimens? One commonly thinks that this aspect of personal selfhood has been recognized only in modern thought; in fact it was recognized already by St. Thomas Aquinas. Creatura autem rationalis divinae providentiae substat sicut secundum se gubernata et provisa, non solum propter speciem, ut aliae corruptibiles creaturae : quia individuum quod gubernatur solum propter speciem, non gubernatur propter seipsum; creatura autem rationalis propter seipsam gubernatur, ut ex dictis manifestum est. Sic igitur solae rationales creaturae directionem a Deo ad suos actus accipiunt non solum propter speciem, sed secundum individuum.2 Notice that Aquinas teaches here the metaphysical ultimacy of personal incommunicability; it exists even before God in the sense 2 " Now, a rational creature exists under divine providence as a being governed and provided for in himself, and not simply for the sake of his species, as is the case with other corruptible creatures. For the individual that is governed only for the sake of the species is not governed for its own sake, but the rational creature is governed for his own sake, as is clear from what we have said (ch. 112). And so, only rational creatures receive direction from God in their acts, not only for the species, but for the individual." Summa Contra Gentiles, III, ch. 113 (Bourke translation). By the way, Chapters 111-114 of Book III seem to me to constitute the most " personalist " passage' in the entire corpus of St. Thomas. The modern reader sees to his amazement that St. Thomas here has already made his own the Kantian idea that each person in a sense exists for his... (shrink)

We present English translations of two French documents to show that the main reason for the rejection of Semmelweis's theory of the cause of childbed fever was because his proof relied on the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, and not because Joseph Skoda referred only to cadaveric particles as the cause in his lecture to the Academy of Science on Semmelweis's discovery. Friedrich Wieger, an obstetrician from Strasbourg, published an accurate account of Semmelweis's theory six months before Skoda's (...) lecture, and reported a case in which the causative agent originated from a source other than cadavers. Wieger also presented data showing that chlorine hand disinfection reduced the annual maternal mortality rate from childbed fever from more than 7 per cent for the years 1840–1846 to 1.27 per cent in 1848, the first full year in which chlorine hand disinfection was practised. But an editorial in the Gazette médicale de Paris rejected the data as proof of the effectiveness of chlorine hand disinfection, stating that the fact that the MMR fell after chlorine hand disinfection was implemented did not mean that this innovation had caused the MMR to fall. This previously unrecognized objection to Semmelweis's proof was also the reason why Semmelweis's chief rejected Semmelweis's evidence. (shrink)

Tematem artykułu jest filozofia miłości rozwijana przez dwóch wybitnych fenomenologów wymienionych w tytule: Dietricha von Hildebranda i Karola Wojtyłę. Obydwaj korzystali w swoich badaniach z metody fenomenologicznej; celem artykułu jest pokazanie, że w obydwu wypadkach metoda ta prowadziła do podobnych rezultatów. Autor czyni to w trzech krokach. Po pierwsze, pokazuje, że miłość pojętą w sensie ogólnym obydwaj autorzy rozumieją jako odpowiedź na wartość osoby. W Lubelskiej Szkole Personalizmu zasada miłości została wyrażona w formule: persona est affirmanda propter seipsam, a (...) treścią afirmacji, która jest należna osobie, jest miłość. W kategoriach von Hildebranda zasada ta wyrażona jest w sposób następujący: dobro osoby afirmowane jest poprzez obiektywne dobra dla osoby, które stanowią właściwą treść miłości. Po drugie, obydwaj autorzy wiele uwagi poświęcają tej specyficznej formie miłości, jaką jest miłość małżeńska. Podczas gdy mińość w sensie ogólnym stanowi odpowiedź na wyjątkową wartość osoby w stosunku do świata pozaosobowego, to miłość małżeńska jest odpowiedzią na wyjątkową wartość jednej osoby pośród wszystkich innych osób doświadczaną przez osobę płci przeciwnej. W tym sensie miłość małżeńska jest również specyficzną odpowiedzią na wartość. Po trzecie, doświadczenie miłości małżeńskiej pokazuje, że nie istnieje sprzeczność między wolnością a wzajemną przynależnością, co von Hildebrand wyraził w pojciu intentio unionis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 22 (2002) 163-179 [Access article in PDF] Emptiness and Dogma Joseph S. O'Leary Sophia University The controversial Vatican document Dominus Iesus reasserts that non-Christian religions are objectively in a defective situation as regards salvation.Etymologically, salvation (soteria salus) means health. Here I should like to reflect on apparent symptoms of ill health in Christian theology and ask if Buddhist wisdom can help us formulate a diagnosis and (...) bring the issues into perspective in a healing way. I shall take as my guiding thread an idea familiar to readers of this journal, namely, that Christian theology has suffered from a delusive clinging to substance and identity, and that the Buddhist teachings of dependent co-arising, emptiness, and non-self may provide an antidote.Biblical and Christian traditions are rich in resources for a critique of substantialist conceptions of God and self. The God of the Bible is constantly shattering the fixated, idolatrous images his worshippers form of him, and the Johannine language of God as Spirit, light, love, locates God in a dynamic realm of communal contemplation from which it would be difficult to distill a well-defined divine substance suited to metaphysical analysis. As for self, Paul, and later Luther, present the Christian self as an existential and relational event, not a substantial self-contained soul.What of Christian theology as shaped from Greek metaphysics? Is it irredeemably substantialist, prey to naive reification and objectification? The definition of God as ipsum esse subsistens("being itself subsisting") sufficiently eludes objectification to include the Plotinian sense of God as "beyond being." The idea adopted from Aristotle that "the soul [as knower] is in a manner all things" suggests that metaphysical theology also developed a nonobjectifying conception of human being. The Christological debates of the early Christian centuries rely of necessity on substance language, yet in placing that terminology at the service of a revealed mystery beyond the grasp of language or thought, they introduce a ferment of paradox into the play of concepts and make of it a dance of traces, following the contours of a reality that cannot be brought under substantialist rubrics.Some might see the brilliant relational fireworks of Thomist trinitarian speculation as deconstructing logocentric images of divinity. However, the Trinity in itself is probably best seen as an abstract remainder concept, postulated as a dim background of the revealed phenomenon of Father, Jesus Christ, and Spirit, so that to spin stories of theories about it is futile, a form of misplaced concreteness. Robert Magliola finds [End Page 163] Nagarjunian resonances in the trinitarian logic of the Council of Florence, notably in the decree it addressed to the Copts in 1442 (Magliola, 85-89). The Copts were given an extra dose of the logic that had caused profound unease among the Greek delegates three years earlier (see Gill, 227-232; 325). How much of this later logic did the Latins read back into the patristic texts they cited? Though unbeatable in the fifteenth century, how convincing is it today? Theology has to face the hermeneutical task, and an ongoing one, of assessing the status and function of this trinitarian logic and referring it back to the biblical basis.The desubstantializing tendencies just noted can be drawn on in a contemporary "overcoming of metaphysics" in theology. But the mainstream of the tradition invested massively in substance and identity. It was by strong affirmations of substantial identity that Christianity made its way in the world. Dogma determined the identities of Father, Son, and Spirit as consubstantial hypostases of the one God, the identity of Jesus Christ as true God and true man united in one hypostasis, the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, the unity, sufficiency, infallibility of the Church and its Scriptures, the continuity of the episcopal and papal ministries as transmitted from the apostles. The substantiality of what was proclaimed was matched by the total conviction of the faith that proclaimed it. Theologians might tinker with speculative elaborations, but the core of faith and dogma was untouchable, never subjected to doubt or questioning.It is a kind of metadogma that all... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Unspoken Word: Negative Theology in Meister Eckhart's German SermonsOliver DaviesBruce Milem. The Unspoken Word: Negative Theology in Meister Eckhart's German Sermons. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2002. Pp. ix + 192. Cloth, $44.95.Questions of meaning in Meister Eckhart's German sermons have prompted a series of recent studies by scholars interested in the dynamics of language and piety as they emerged in vernacular texts written (...) in Northern Europe in the late Middle Ages. Bruce Milem's book sits within this school of reflection and is to be distinguished by his decision to frame the discussion within the context of a theory of the image, as developed by Eckhart across a number of works. It is this hermeneutic which gives coherence to The Unspoken Word and which allows the author to build an understanding of the role of language in Eckhart's sermons that draws upon Brecht's theory of the Verfremdungseffekt. According to this, alienation of language, or the disruption of its ordinary meanings, acts as its objectification in such a way that the audience is prompted to reflect upon their own situatedness with respect to the meanings which are disclosed within it. Language, or narrative, of this kind acts as a hermeneutic of self-critique and enhanced self-understanding.Milem bases his argument concerning the image on a close reading of just four sermons: 52 (Beati pauperes spiritu), Sermon 2 (Intravit Iesus in quoddam castellum), Sermon 16B (Quasi vas auri solidum) and Sermon 6 (Iusti vivent in aeternum). In these texts, expressed in different ways, he discerns firstly a theoretical outworking of the image as something that is defined by virtue of its relation to its source. The classic discussion of this comes in Sermon 16B with its discourse on a reflection in a mirror, whereby the image is "at one" with its source. But Milem rightly extends this theory to mean that in so far as all created things are images, they can be defined with respect to their relation to their source in God, rather than that of which they are images. But created images can also be defined in terms of their dissimilarity to their source: their incompleteness and temporality. The particular place of the sermon is given with its capacity to enact this condition of the image in ways that make it explicit.Milem argues for the German sermon as "an event" which is at the same time a mode of self-knowing, whereby the self comes to a deeper realisation of its dependence upon the divine at every moment of its being and action. Being ourselves constituted as "image," we are conditioned by the dialectic of likeness and distinction which characterises the relation of all images to the Creator. In our case however this is a state which can be realised in an existential act of reflection as a possibility which is opened up for us by our entry into the very particular, disruptive linguistic world of the sermon. This is an advancement on Walter Haug's notion of the language of the sermon as "transformational" but it adds to it a nice distinction of the status of the human creature as "image" and therefore conditioned by dissimilarity as much as likeness.In The Unspoken Word, Bruce Milem offers us a careful and intelligent analysis of the four sermons as exemplifying a kind of linguistic alienation which serves the end of self-illumination, as we come into a new possession of ourselves as being both intensively "like" God and utterly distinct from Him. This is not merely a cognitive change in us but also an existential one, as Milem's analysis of the theme of justice and human action in Sermon 6 shows. To this extent, his use of the hermeneutic of the image as signaling both likeness and distinction at an existential level usefully opens up new avenues of understanding. To some extent however this trajectory would have been strengthened by taking into account the two areas of inquiry with which Milem chooses not to engage (15-18), namely the relation between the German and Latin works and the question of whether... (shrink)

Al lettore che nella produzione speculativa di Anselmo si sofferma in modo particolare su De veritate, De libertate arbitrii, De casu diaboli e De concordia, la volontà si manifesta come un indiscutibile centro di interesse della riflessione anselmiana, tesa a determinare teoreticamente il valore e l'efficacia della iustitia, intesa come rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata, in ambito etico ed ontologico. La voluntas si presenta così quale protagonista del rapporto tra Dio e creatura, tra natura, storia ed eternità, perché è (...) proprio mediante gli atti volontari che la creatura può inserirsi od opporsi attivamente al rectus ordo della creazione, che a sua volta costituisce come una forma di libera oggettivazione del farsi altro da sé, rimanendo se stessa, della summa rectitudo. Attraverso questo movimento la rectitudo e la recta voluntas divina si pongono e si mostrano come l'essenza della realtà. Rivelando voluntas e rectitudo una valenza ad un tempo etica e metafisica, si potenzia il significato della volontà come responsabilità e come agente intrinsecamente libero che Anselmo le attribuisce. La voluntas, che vuole perché vuole, si sottrae al regno della necessità e si impone, in quanto artefice di libertà, come la protagonista aporetica della relazione tra la stabilità dell'ordine della realtà e la novità della storia, inchiodando Anselmo, amante della necessità razionale, alla celebrazione di una forza decisiva e ultimativa, che sembra sfuggire al pieno controllo della ratio. (shrink)

The first mistake would be to think the Vatican's recent declaration Dominus Iesus is primarily a theological document. It is not -- even though it advertises itself as being that, with a specific focus on (according to its subtitle) "The Unicity and Salvific Universality of Jesus Christ and the Church.".

This study is an attempt to show that demonstration was conceived by medieval commentators as an instrument for advancing knowledge of the world. Although the theory of demonstration is not a “logic of discovery”, its specific aim would be to describe the characteristics that should have a discourse to be able to express the causal articulation of things belonging to the same genre. From the analysis of some texts by Thomas Aquinas on the distinction between knowledge propter quid and (...) knowledge quia, it will be shown that the causal articulation represents the very novelty which is supposed to be acquired by a demonstrative syllogism. This conclusion will be confirmed by the analysis of some texts of the al-Ghazālī’s Logica which seem to reveal presuppositions of the writings of Latin commentators like Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

Lullus' conception of man is expressed in his definition of man as "animal/ens homificans". It is based on the augustinian understnding of being and is articulated in his dctrine of correlatives, determinig triadically every substance, consisting of the ability of activity, the active and the activity. Thus evry substance is understood as a substantial relation. From the definition of man as "animal/ens homificans" it results that the man creates himself throuhg activity, vhich brings him closer to the abstract essence of (...) his species, namely in his striving at moral perfection. Thus he humanizes the whole universe, aiming at the the human unity and the unity with the universe. This interpersonal aspect is embodied in a modified definition of man as "animl homificans interpersonale propter animam rationalem suam". (shrink)

: We question the claim, common since Duhem, that sixteenth century astronomy, and especially the Wittenberg interpretation of Copernicus, was instrumentalistic rather than realistic. We identify a previously unrecognized Wittenberg astronomer, Edo Hildericus (Hilderich von Varel), who presents a detailed exposition of Copernicus's cosmology that is incompatible with instrumentalism. Quotations from other sixteenth century astronomers show that knowledge of the real configuration of the heavens was unattainable practically, rather than in principle. Astronomy was limited to quia demonstrations, although demonstration (...) class='Hi'>propter quid remained the ideal. We suggest that Osiander's notorious preface to Copernicus expresses these sixteenth century commonplaces rather than twentieth century instrumentalism, and that neither `realism', nor `instrumentalism', in their modern meanings, apply to sixteenth century astronomy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 49-75 [Access article in PDF] Sensible Ends:Latent Teleology in Descartes' Account of Sensation Alison Simmons One of Descartes' hallmark contributions to natural philosophy is his denunciation of teleology. It is puzzling, then, to find him arguing in Meditation VI that human beings have sensations in order to preserve the union of mind and body (AT VII 83). 1 This appears to (...) be just the sort of teleological explanation that he proscribes. Descartes' Anglo-American commentators have had little to say about the teleological overtones of his claims about sensation. His French commentators acknowledge these overtones, but seem largely untroubled by them. 2 It is worth pausing to be troubled, for a closer analysis reveals that Descartes' famous proscription against teleology is not as simple as it is generally thought to be. In the first half of this essay, I argue that Descartes advocates a genuinely teleological conception of the senses. My aim is not to charge Descartes with employing illicit teleology, but to argue that there is a place for teleology even in his revisionist natural philosophy. Accordingly, in the second half of this essay, I argue that Descartes' assault on teleological explanation is [End Page 49] not a sweeping assault on finality, but a more directed attack on particular uses of ends in natural philosophy. Descartes' assault leaves standing a form of teleological explanation that proves crucial to his own treatment of sensation. 1. Descartes' Rejection of Teleological Explanation at a Glance A teleological explanation is one that purports to account for something in terms of its ends or its function relative to the ends of the system of which it is a part. Aristotle's physics provides many classic examples: plants produce leaves for the protection of their fruit; spiders spin webs in order to catch food; animals grow sharp front teeth and dull back teeth in order to facilitate biting and chewing respectively; eyes are for seeing. According to Aristotle, all natural phenomena are directed toward ends and no explanation is complete without a teleological component that specifies the end for the sake of which the phenomenon occurs. Indeed ends take explanatory priorityover other causes: "Both causes [the end and the matter] must be stated by the student of nature, but especially the end; for that is the cause of the matter, not vice versa." 3 And: [T]he causes concerned in natural generation are, as we see, more than one. There is the cause for the sake of which [the end], and the cause whence the beginning of motion comes [the efficient cause]. Now we must decide which of these two causes comes first, which second. Plainly, however, that cause is the first which we call that for the sake of which. For this is the account of the thing, and the account forms the starting-point.4In other words, Aristotle argues that natural substances have the matter they do, have the parts or organs they do, are organized as they are and act as they do for the sake of their ends. To explain why things are as they are, the natural philosopher must therefore explain the ways in which they contribute to ends.Among the late scholastic Aristotelians familiar to Descartes there is considerable debate concerning the causal efficacy of ends. Genuine final causation, in which something is said to be acted on by an end, is limited to the intentional behavior of rational agents who consciously recognize their ends: only something that recognizes an end can be "moved" by one. Even here the sort of causation involved is peculiar: a rational agent is "moved" by an end insofar as the end induces a "metaphorical motion" toward (or desire for) the end in the agent's will. 5 While these scholastic Aristotelians resist attributing final causation [End Page 50] to non-rational creatures, they nevertheless persist in attributing ends to them. When Toletus, Rubio, the Coimbrans and Suarez take up the question whether nature acts propter finem, each answers it affirmatively: natural... (shrink)

Excerpt from Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta Plagulis correctis indicibusque non sine taedio confectis dum respiro et laetiore animo quid praefandum sit meditor, ecce nuntius longe tris tissimus afi'ertur, georgium kaibelium nobis litterisque acerba morte ereptum esse, qui non solum studiorum societate inde a beatissimo oon tu'oernio - Bonnensi mihi erat coniunctissimus, sed in hoc quoque communi amicorum opere velut auspex et signifer, cuius auctoritatem me aequi et decebat et iuvabat. Nam singularis graecae artis cognitio, quae in illo fuit, in nullo genere (...) litterarum magis enituit quam in Comicis, unde splendidum ante biennium factum est huius Corporis initium. Iam adu lescentem prima tirocinia in Aristophane ponere memini eundemque audio supremam fuisse moribundi curam ac querelem. Inter bos vitae laboriosae et fructuosae terminos omnem graecitatem peragravit et undique messem uberrimam rettulit; at nusquam libentius et intentius versabatur quam in atticae comoediae reliquiis. Dorienses enim, quos edidit, propter illos cpinor tetigerat.' quodsi verum est cum primi illins voluminis perfectione vix unam alteramve aequalium editionem recte posse eom parari, quid prasstaturum eum fuisse credimus, si fatum concessisset, ut ipsam 'atticam comoediam nobis ex fragmentis instauraret, in qua totus habitabat et spirabat! Aut nemo mortalium aut, si quisquam, ille et natus erat et paratus ad Menandri et aequalium umbras ex inferis citandas et in vitae lucem revocandas. Adeo in intimam eorum consuetudinem inde fesso labore atque fortasse magis etiam sensus quadam cognatione se insinuaverat. Nam tota eius indoles ad atticum istum saporem facta erat. Ut scripture eius elegantia apicum prae ceteris nitebat, ut suavissima sermocinatio mirum quantum amicos tenebat, priusquam morbi ingra veseentie tormentis animi serenitas obscurari coepta est, ita tota eius ars versus graecos et exblicandi et pangendi Praxiteleo quodam perfusa erat nitore. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Het zal geen van de aanwezigen verbazen dat we het volgende allemaal tegenkomen in empirisch onderzoek: verborgen aannames, ongegronde conclusies, vreemde analyse-eenheden, een ontbrekende uitsplitsing van gegevens, een ‘post hoc ergo propter hoc’-redenering (een simpele correlatie die leidt tot ongerechtvaardigde gevolgtrekkingen over oorzaak en gevolg), ontbrekende contextuele verklaringen, onjuiste en misleidende vergelijkingen, onthutsend onbetrouwbare steekproeven die leiden tot uiterst dubieuze extrapolaties, en hypotheses die voorspellen of proberen te achterhalen en bevestigen wat de gemiddelde persoon al weet. We beschikken natuurlijk (...) over een overvloed aan gegevens uit pedagogisch en onderwijskundig onderzoek en een haast onbegrensde hoeveelheid grafieken en tabellen met cijfers die pretenderen iets te meten. Deze gegevens komen echter maar al te vaak tot stand op basis van concepten van twijfelachtige waarde. Er ontbreekt vaak een ondersteunend theoretisch kader waarmee bevindingen kunnen worden geïnterpreteerd, verklaard of vertaald naar andere contexten, en waarmee bovendien de betekenis van de resultaten aan niet-specialisten kan worden duidelijk gemaakt. (shrink)

Term Functor Logic is a term logic that recovers some important features of the traditional, Aristotelian logic; however, it turns out that it does not preserve all of the Aristotelian properties a valid inference should have insofar as the class of theorems of Term Functor Logic includes some inferences that may be considered irrelevant (e.g. ex falso, verum ad, and petitio principii). By following an Aristotelian or syllogistic notion of relevance, in this contribution we adapt a tableaux method for Term (...) Functor Logic in order to avoid irrelevance and we offer some sort of intuitive semantics in terms of traditional inferential situations (e.g. propter quid, quia, non causa ut causa, and non sequitur). (shrink)

One conventional view of businesses is to reduce them to mere performers of economic transactions in an exercise of exchange based on the “logic of self‐interest,” and under the criterion do ut des, meaning “I give in order that you may give.” Drawing from personalist philosophy, this article argues that financial and organizational interactions are encounters, relations between persons, not mere economic transactions. Furthermore, people involved in business have the capacity to establish relations of gratuity with others under the criterion (...) do propter alterum, that is, “give to the other as another,” without expecting a return. This criterion is at the core of the “logic of gift.” We argue that giving authentic gifts is intrinsically good, since it contributes to the human flourishing of those who practice this behavior. Implementing the “logic of gift” is also beneficial for the company because it contributes to humanizing the company. In addition, applying the logic of gift will probably bring about trust and social cohesion between people, with positive consequences for business performance, which is consistent with previous findings. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have given up on the quest for a silver bullet to put an end to all pseudoscience, as such a neat formal criterion to separate good science from its contenders has proven elusive. In the literature on critical thinking and in some philosophical quarters, however, this search for silver bullets lives on in the taxonomies of fallacies. The attractive idea is to have a handy list of abstract definitions or argumentation schemes, on the basis of which one (...) can identify bad or invalid types of reasoning, abstracting away from the specific content and dialectical context. Such shortcuts for debunking arguments are tempting, but alas, the promise is hardly if ever fulfilled. Different strands of research on the pragmatics of argumentation, probabilistic reasoning and ecological rationality have shown that almost every known type of fallacy is a close neighbor to sound inferences or acceptable moves in a debate. Nonetheless, the kernel idea of a fallacy as an erroneous type of argument is still retained by most authors. We outline a destructive dilemma we refer to as the Fallacy Fork: on the one hand, if fallacies are construed as demonstrably invalid form of reasoning, then they have very limited applicability in real life. On the other hand, if our definitions of fallacies are sophisticated enough to capture real-life complexities, they can no longer be held up as an effective tool for discriminating good and bad forms of reasoning. As we bring our schematic “fallacies” in touch with reality, we seem to lose grip on normative questions. Even approaches that do not rely on argumentation schemes to identify fallacies fail to escape the Fallacy Fork, and run up against their own version of it. (shrink)

AM Hendropriyono 2021, Filsafat Intelijen. Sebuah Esai ke Arah Landasan Berpikir, Strategi, serta Refleksi Kasus-kasus Aktual, Jakarta: PT Hedropriyono Strategic Consulting. Bagi seorang "filosof emeritus" ("filosof afkiran") seperti penulis buku Hendropriyono menarik karena menjadi kelihatan bagaimana seorang 0tokoh yang profesinya jauh dari filsafat dapat memanfaatkan pendekatan filosofis. Yang dimaksud Hendropriyono dengan "filsafat Intelijens" memang bukan filsafat seperti filsafat moral atau filsafat politik atau filsafat manusia. Melainkan filsafat sebagai cara seorang tokoh inteligens Indonesia menjalankan tugasnya, mengumpulkan pengetahuan tentang ancaman-ancaman tersembunyi yang (...) dihadapi suatu negara, dalam kasus ini, Indonesia. Dalam definisi Hendropriyono: "Filsafat intelijen memahami keamanan sebagai suatu kebebasan dari bahaya yang mengancam personal, informasi, komunikasi, pernaskahan fisik dan non-fisik serta lingkungan hidup manusia" h. 103). Hendropriyono memperlihatkan bagaimana ketajaman filosofis dapat membantu melihat realitas dari pelbagai segi, menghindar misalnya dari tiga sikap keliru klasik yang sudah diangkat oleh para filosof Yunani, sofisme, paralogisme dan sikap echolalian (h. 56), sadar akan perangkap logical fallacies seperti argumentasi ad hominem, sikap latah (bandwagon), kesimpulan yang tergesa-gesa (hasty generalization), menganggap A disebabkan B hanya karena terjadi sesudah B (post hoc, bukan propter hoc), dikotomi keliru, circular reasoning dan membiarkan diri dibawa sesat karena mengikuti suatu red herring (h. 133 s.). Pendekatan filosofis akan membuat was-was terhadap "pemikrian konspirasi", informasi top-down dan hoaks. Dalam bukunya Hendropriyono membawa pendekatan filosofis itu pada kejadian-kejadian di dekade-dekade terakhir. Msalnya Arab spring dengan pergolakan-pergolakan luar biasa yang mengikutinya: Mesir dengan semangat demokrasi yang justru membawa Ikhwanul Muslimen ke puncak kekuasaan, hanya untuk kemudian digulingkan oleh Jendral Siwi dengan dukungan Al Azhar dan Gereja Koptik. Kekacauan luar biasa di Siria dan Irak di mana Amerika Serikat mendukung gerakan demokratis dengan harapan bisa menggulingkan diktator Bashar al-Assad, hanya untuk akhirnya malah menjadi pendukung ISIS - yang menyingkirkan gerakan demokratis - karena Assad didukung oleh Rusia dan Iran. Sebelumnya Amerika Serikat juga dengan logika kepentingannya membuat kacau Haiti: Sesudah Amerika mendukung Jean-Bertrand Aristide, presiden pertama Haiti yang dipilih secara demokratis, yang menggantikan diktator "Baby Doc" Duvalier, tetapi karena Aristide dianggap terlalu kiri, Amerika mendukung penggulingannya; sampai sekarang Haiti kacau. Dan ada contoh logical dan political fallacies lain yang dianalisa, misalnya perang proxy di Afganistan. Tentu Hendropriyono juga memakai pendekatan filsafat untuk melihat pekembangan di Indonesia. Amendemen UUD 1946 pasca reformasi, masalah Papua, gejala populisme, keberhasilan deradikalisasi seperti misalnya terwujud dalam Pondok Pesantren Al-Zaitun. Sama dengan alm. Romo Nikolaus Drijarkara Hendropriyono menunjukkan bahwa "Sila Pancasila yang Ke II, Kemanusiaan yang Adil dan Beradab, merupakan landasan bagi implementasi seluruh sila-sila dalam Pancasila" (142). Tentu ada juga beberapa kesalahan. Perang Napoleon tentu berlangsung di abad ke-18 dan permulaan abad ke-19 (h. 29), Hitler berkuasa di Jerman tahun 1933 (h. 38), demonstrasi dua Desember (212) terjadi di tahun 2017, bukan 2016 (56), dan PD II bukannya diadakan untuk menjatuhkan Hitler, melainkan yang memulainya memang Hitler (146). Buku ini sekaligus membuat pembaca paham bagaimana Hendropriyono melihat realitas politik, baik di Indonesia maupuan situasi internasional. Ia bermaksud menunjukkan bagaimana "kacamata" filsafat membantu untuk memahami apa yang terjadi dalam dimensi politik, dimensi utama yang mau dilindungi dari kejahatan oleh aparat inteligence. Suatu buku yang cukup khas. Franz Magnis-Suseno. (shrink)